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Place of Persona' Expense Deductions
in the Income Tax
Relation of Deductions to Net Income
DIRECTLY related to that most vexing question of what constitutes
personal income, in the context of an income tax, is the question of
what expenditures should be allowed as deductions in the computation
of a tax base. Under the federal personal income tax law—as indeed
under many foreign and most state income tax laws—provision has
been made for two kinds of deductions. There are, first, those intended
to refine gross income to economic net income by subtraction from
gross receipts of the expenses and losses incurred in the pursuit of
income. Second, there are the deductions that, at the discretion of
Congress, are intended to attain a particular goal of social or economic
policy, or to help establish a measure of a person's capacity to pay
taxes, which transcends the limits of a strictly economic concept of
income. Thus the deduction allowable for philanthropic contribu-
tions is commonly regarded as a means of stimulating socially desirable
expenditures; the allowance to deduct medical expenses above a
certain percentage of income is usually considered a refinement of
net income to take account of what are considered differences between
the relative capacities of taxpayers to pay taxes.
The question of what deductions are appropriate and desirable
in arriving at taxable income has thus depended in part on the con-
cept of income upon which the tax is based, and in part on what
particular policy objectives and equity considerations commend them-
selves to Congress as suitable to be dealt with through tax law adapta-
tions. Consequently, the tax laws need not draw, and indeed have not
always drawn, an explicit distinction between deductions stemming
from the particular income concept adopted and deductions that serve
some independent purpose. Yet such a distinction is valuable as a
guide to policy, which is aided by more exact knowledge of identity and
size of the deductions presently allowed on grounds other than the
derivations of economic personal income.
While neither the Constitution nor successive income tax acts con-
tain definitions that could be said to establish a concept of income
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for tax purposes,1 the statutes, regulations, and judicial rulings have
nevertheless resulted in a general, though not very precise, concept of
taxable income. Briefly, the tax is based on realized net money income
"from whatever source derived," including gains derived from dealings
in property and, in some instances, nonmoney receipts that can be
readily determined and evaluated.2 The refinement of grossincome
1Thefirst federal income tax act did not even stipulate whether gross or net
income was to be taxed, although it appears that the taxation of net income was
desired. Senator James F. Simmons, author of the bill, remarked that he had thought
of putting the word "net" in, "But I could see so many ways of evading it that
I thought it better to let the Secretary of the Treasury prescribe his rules, and let
the bill cover all incomes" (Congressional Globe, July 29, 1861, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 315). The 16th amendment to the Constitution, from which the federal govern-
Inent has since 1913 derived its power to collect income taxes as we know them today,
states simply that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes
from whatever sources derived...." Subsequently,income tax laws have used the
term "net income" and have enumerated at length some of the sources of "gains,
profits and income" to be included, without, however, defining the term "net
come" as such. This situation is by no means peculiar to the federal income tax.
Great Britain's tax code also contains to this day no general definition of income.
Moreover, the majority of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and In-
come, in its recent final report (Cmd. 9474, London, 1955), accepted the celebrated
principle on which British courts have long based their interpretations, that "in-
come tax is a tax on income." In the Commission's words, "We have not looked to
refine upon this principle by producing a more precise definition" (p. 8). Henry C.
Simons' characterization is possibly the most trenchant: "Tax laws do not really
define income but merely set up rules as to what must be included and what may be
deducted; and such rules by no means define income because they are neither ex-
haustive nor logically coherent." Personal Income Taxation, Chicago, 1938, p. 105.
2Withsmall exceptions, such as monetary value of food and living quarters re-
ceived as part of wages or salary, no attempts have been made at the federal level
to go beyond money income and to impute income receipts in kind, although the
latter clearly have some influence on the individual's relative capacity to pay. Since,
at least in the Northern part of the United States, collection of the tax in anything
but money form was never contemplated, it can be argued that the tax should also
restrict itself to money income as a base. Otherwise, particularly at the time of the
Civil War tax, some taxpayers might have been required to give up a very large
part of their money income owing to the relative size of their income in kind. It
is widely, recognized that computation of income taxes has been based predominantly
on money income: "Since an estimate of value has an extremely subjective char-
acter ...itis clear.*. thatcourts and legislatures will tend to avoid such esti-
mates so far as possible. This tendency leads to the limitation of the recognition of
income for tax purposes to receipts either in money or susceptible of easy valua-
tion therein." "Since the tax must be paid in money there is a tendency to include in
taxable income only those receipts which can readily be measured in money" (Ros-
well Magill, Taxable Income, New York, 1936, pp. 21, 195). Speaking of income taxes,
Pigou observed that "in general ... thetax gatherer has to content himself, for his
object of assessment, with money income" (A. C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance,
3rd ed., revised, London, 1952, p. 78). Haig noted that "the net income which our
1918 Act attempts to reach is in the main money income." After offering his classic
definition of taxable income from the point of view of "fundamental economics and
equity" (see note 7 below), he concludes that "the concept [of taxable income] as
it stands in our own law is probably the closest approach to true economic income
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to net income hasbeenconstrued, broadly speaking, as deduction
from the taxpayer's receipts of "ordinary and necessary" expenses con-
nected with the creation of his income, and of losses that might be
incurred in the course of activity directed toward the acquisition of
income or gain. Conceivably, if size of net income were to be the only
differentiation between taxpayers, this concept of net income could
have constituted the base for the schedule of tax rates.
From the beginning, no such rigorous definition of the tax base was
implicit in our tax laws. In fact, they went well beyond that definition
in the direction of a narrower base, by two provisions. One, the allow-
able personal deductions, remained for a long time undefined and
concealed; the other, the personal exemption, was at all times explicit
in freeing from tax a part of what the statutes defined as income for
a given year.3 The personal exemption has, as a rule, varied in amount
with the taxpayer's family status and the number of his dependents.
The recent additional exemptions for taxpayers over 65 years of age,
and for those wholly or partially blind, introduce some supplementary
variation by age and by state of health. The reasons for such personal
exemptions of given amounts of net income has been variously pre-
sented as the need for keeping untouched by the tax a subsistence
amount of income, or a reasonable standard of living, and also the
desire to eliminate as taxpayers those whose liability would be too
small to warrant the expense of processing such returns.4 In all the
income tax laws from 1913 to 1954, personal exemptions were granted
in the form of subtractions from whatever constituted statutory net
yet achieved by any country" (R. M. Haig, "The Concept of Income—Economic and
Legal Aspects," in The Federal Income Tax, R. M. Haig, ed., 1921, pp. 23, 27).
8 This view of the personal exemptions was most clearly stated as early as 1896 by
GeorgSchanz(the generally recognized "father" of the Haig.Simons concept of in-
come, see note 7 below) in "Der Einkommensbegriff und die Einkommensteuer.
gesetze" (The Income Concept and the Income Tax Laws), Finanz Archiv, xm
(1896), p. 33: "When the lawmaker leaves a subsistence minimum taxfree, or when
he takes into consideration the number of persons in the family dependent on the
income by allowing, for example, a deduction for minor children, then this has no
connection with the income concept. It is simply that capacity to pay is not de.
termined by size of income alone." (Translation ours.)
4 The question of the rationale underlying the personal exemptions will be dealt
with in more detail by Lawrence H. Seltzer in a later part of our study of the per-
sonal income tax. It is enough to note here merely two of many divergent views.
"No clear guiding principle can be discerned for the determination of the amount
of these allowances other than the revenue need" (Committee on Postwar Tax
Policy, A Tax Program for a Solvent America, New York, 1945, p. 110). In contrast:
"It is almost unanimously agreed that some exemption keyed to at least a minimum
subsistence standard of living is desirable" (Walter J. Blum and.Harry Ralven, Jr.,
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, University of Chicago, 1953, p. 4).
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income at the time. Congress thereby made more or less explicit that
net income was not considered enough of a refinement of gross income
for determining the tax base; alternately, the revenue needs were not
large enough to require using all of the tax base available under the net
income concept adopted. In 1954, "statutory net income" disappeared
from the vocabulary of both the tax return forms and the Revenue
code. Personal exemptions are referred to in the new code as deduc-
tions, and on the tax return forms they are treated as deductions from
adjusted gross income in computing taxable income.
Expense deductions, from the beginning of the modern income tax,
have not been restricted to expenses and losses related to the produc-
tion of taxable income. The income tax law of 1913 allowed deduction
of all interest paid, taxes paid, and casualty losses (and bad debts,
discussed below) without specific reference to their relation to taxable
income. In practice, at that time and later, the personal deductions
allowed in computing statutory income were nonbusiness interest, as
paid on home mortgages and personal debts; nonbusiness tax pay-
ments, as personal income taxes and residential property taxes; and
losses of personal property due to fire and storm (later also flood, theft,
and accident) not compensated for by insurance.
The 1913 law, as well as later acts, allowed specifically for the de-
duction of worthless debts charged off during the taxable year. Several
writers have included this item among the personal deductions.5 Its
retention (a legacy from the Civil War income tax) among deductions
gave rise to some doubt in the Senate about its nature. Senator Albert
B. Cummins, discussing the item described in the 1913 bill as "debts
due to the taxpayer actually ascertained to be worthless and charged
off within the year," spoke of a $100,000 note in his possession, pre-
sumably worthless: "I am permitted by this bill to deduct $100,000
from my income. .. althoughI had just as much income as though
the man had remained solvent. I have simply lost a part of my capital
or property, and it is proposed here to repair that loss by deducting
5 "Usually, personal expenses are not deductible, but the federal income tax de-
parts from this general rule by allowing deduction of ... baddebts not contracted
in business transactions. ..." (TwentiethCentury Fund, Facing the Tax Problem,
New York, 1937, p. 562.) Magill speaks of "a debt ascertained to be worthless and
charged off, even though the loan was unconnected with the taxpayer's business or
professional activities" as among the deductions that "may be allowable, although
they are entirely unconnected with the earning of the income which is the subject
of the tax" (op.cit., pp. 319-20). William J. Shultz and C. Lowell Harriss list "un-
collectible debts ... insome cases" among personal expense deductions (American
Public Finance, 6th ed., New York, 1954, p. 281).
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its amount from my income." It was the Senator's contention that the
borrower had nothing to do with his income, had not contributed
toward it, and was not interested in the source of his income.6
Yet it might be argued that this is at best a borderline case. The
production of income (in the form of interest), which is usually tax-
able, may motivate the lender, even if a loan is not made in the ordinary
course of business. A loss, in case of default, might have no more
validity as a personal expense than losses incurred in the course of
other activities directed toward earning income. More doubtful is
the status of an interest-free loan to a friend or relative, who declares
himself unable to repay—a loan probably more a personal gift than
a financial asset. Even in terms of the Haig-Simons concept of taxable
income such an unrepaid debt may not be deductible.7
Casualty losses on personal property, mentioned above, may also be
considered a negative income item within the meaning of the Haig-
Simons concept of income, since they may be said to constitute a dimin-
ution in the value of a person's "store of property rights." Indeed, the
federal income tax law recognizes realized increases in the value of per-
sonal possessions and treats them as capital gains, but at the same time
it does not allow deductions for realized losses sustained on assets not
acquired for a "gainful" purpose.8 Thus while losses realized through
sale of personal possessions are not deductible, although realized gains
from sale of such assets are taxable as capital gains, losses from theft,
storm, or fire are fully deductible from ordinary income. For this rea-
son the tax law may be said to establish a presumption, widely reflected
in the literature, that the allowance for casualty losses on personal pos-
sessions is a personal expense deduction.° As in the case of bad debts,
even the Haig-Simons concept of income does not tell when personal
6 Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, p. 3847.
7 In accordance with what is widely known among students of public finance as
the Haig-Simons concept of income, any loan made by a taxpayer—if initially con-
sidered as part of the taxpayer's assets—would become an allowable deduction if the
debt has become uncollectible. Haig defined taxable income as "the money value
of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time" (op.cit.,
p. 7). Simons, similarly, defined personal income as the "algebraic sum of(1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in ques-
tion" (op.cit., p. 50). This concept, too, leaves open the deductibility of worthless
debts whenever the taxpayer's intent in making the loan comes into question.
S See Lawrence H. Seltzer, The Nature and TaxTreatmentof Capital Gains and
Losses, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1951, p. 4.
0 Twentieth Century Fund, op.cit., p. 562; Magill, op.cit., p. 320; William Vickrey,
Agenda for Progressive Taxation, New York, 1947, p. 61; Joseph A. Pechman,
"Erosion of the Individual Income Tax," National Tax Journal, March, 1957, p. 6.
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property losses are essentially capital losses, and when a type of per-
sonal consumption. It may be argued that many of the losses allowed
are generally anticipated and reckoned with as in the normal course
of owning consumer durables.1° We shall further explore this con-
ceptual problem, as well as the quantitative importance of the casualty
loss deduction, in chapter 7.
Brief Legislative History
The roots of the deductions mentioned reach back further than 1913,
the beginning of the modern federal individual income tax.11 Its fore-
runner, the Civil War income tax of 1861-1872, was in fact somewhat
more liberal in this respect. In addition to permitting the deduction of
all federal, state, and local taxes, interest, and various non-business
losses, beginning with the act of 1863, it also allowed tenants to deduct
the annual rent payments on their residences.12 The rent deduction
allowance was an attempt to place renters and homeowners on the
same tax basis. It appears that the early law displayed more concern
with the renter-debtor-owner problem than our modern income tax
laws, although then, in contrast with current practice, the renter was
treated more liberally than the owner.13 The income tax law of 1894,
declared unconstitutional before it could go into operation, also per-
mitted deduction of all taxes, interest, and casualty losses, but did not
include home rent among the deductions.
In 1917, prompted by the pressures exerted by high wartime revenue
requirements, Congress eliminated federal income and profits taxes
from the list of allowable deductions but added contributions made
10 Cf. Vickrey, op.cit., pp. 61-62; Pechman, op.cit., p. 11.
11 See Roy G. and Gladys C. Blakey, The Federal Income Tax, New 'York, 1940,
p.5.
12 F. C. Howe goes so far as to state that "the householder was permitted to deduct
the annual rental value of his homestead, whether occupied as tenant from another,
or held in his own right" (see Charles J. Bullock, Selected Readings in Public Fi-
nance, Boston, 1906, p. 282). Actually, for the owner occupant, this was true only
in the sense that the 1864 act stated specifically that homeowners were not required
to include in their income the rental value of any residences occupied for their
own use. The act of 1867, specific about another exclusion of income in kind, said
that the taxable income of a person should include "the amount of sales of live-
stock, sugar, wool, butter, cheese, pork, beef, mutton, or other meats, hay and grain,
or other vegetable or other productions, being the growth or produce of the estate
of such person, not including any part thereof consumed directly by the family."
13 Under current (1954) tax law, the homeowner's net imputed return on his in-
vestment in a home is not included in his income for tax purposes, and he is al-
lowed to deduct property tax and any mortgage interest. But the sum of these falls
short of the items covered by gross rent, which equals the explicit rent payments of
the tenant.
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within the taxable year to religious, charitable, scientific, and educa-
tional nonprofit organizations. The unlimited deduction of philan-
thropic contributions had been proposed, and rejected, in 1913. By
1917 there was much concern that high tax rates might shut off the flow
of phiranthropy and thus convert privately financed undertakings into
public responsibilities. An passed that year, permitted
deduction of philanthropic contributions up to 15 per cent of net
income. With some recent liberalizations, it has become a permanent
feature of the income tax. The same wartime pressures led shortly after-
wards to the disallowance of the deduction from income of federal
income taxes paid in the preceding year.
Although in the course of a long Senate debate's the question of the
relation of previously paid taxes to net income was brought up several
times, the matter was apparently disposed of primarily on grounds of
expediency.18 Otherwise, it was argued, the tax rates would have to be
commensurately higher to compensate for the revenue loss resulting
from the deduction of the federal income tax on the previous year's
income. Though one senator persistently raised the issue of the federal,
state, and local taxes that remained deductible after there ap-
peared to be little interest in its solution. In part, this is explained by
the fact that the remaining taxes had then relatively little effect on the
size of the tax base (evidently the chief concern of Congress at that
time). It is also partially explained by the apparent lack of distinction
between taxes as a personal and as a business expense.18 Federal excises
and most state and local taxes continued to be deductible.
14 Senator Henry F. Hollis, sponsor of the amendment, introduced it with the
explanation that people usually "contribute to charities and educational objects out
of their surplus.... Now,when war comes and we impose these very heavy taxes
on incomes, that will be the first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to
economize.. .. Theywill say, begins at hornet'" Congressional Record, 65th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1917, p. 6728.
pp. 6317-6327.
16 "It seems to me purely a question of expediency as to whether or not we want
to raise this amount of taxes by excepting the payments that are made to the gov-
ernment" (Senator John F. Shaifroth, ibid., p. 6323). "Previously to this it has not
made very much difference whether they did or not [deduct the federal tax], because
the income tax was not very large; but I can not see any matter of morals or justice
or principle in it. It is a pure matter of expediency. If you so arrange the income tax
this year that you allow those who pay it to take back a third of it next year, you
have simply got to put on a bigger tax. ..." (SenatorHollis, ibid., p. 6324.)
See the remarks of Senator Porter S. McCumber: "...thereis no more sense
in excluding [from net income] taxes paid to a State than excluding those paid to
the government. A tax is a tax" (ibid., p. 6320).
18 Several times during the 1917 debate the question arose whether taxes con-
stitute an "expense." Examples were cited in which taxes were incurred in the
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It was not until the beginning of the Second World War that per-
sonal deductions were further expanded and modified. In 1942 medical
and dental outlays became, to a limited extent, deductible expenses. In
the past such expenses had been considered adequately covered by the
personal exemptions and dependency credits, but as these were low-
ered by successive revenue acts, the need for safeguarding unusual ex-
penditures for medical care by special allowances was widely expound-
ed. The medical expense allowance would undoubtedly have con-
stituted a large separate subtraction from taxable net income, had it
not been for the almost simultaneous introduction of the simplified
tax return,'9 which incorporated a standard deduction.
To make the simplified return applicable to a large number of in-
come recipients, many of whom had become newly liable to the income
tax as a result of wartime increases in income and lowered personal
exemptions, a new statutory income concept was required. It was this
new income concept that at last drew a line between business deduc-
tions and personal deductions. In order to include allowance for per-
sonal deductions in the simplified tax return without causing extreme
inequalities of treatment, it was necessary to place all taxpayers as
nearly as possible on an equal before-deductions basis. So long as the
standard deduction was granted on the bassis of gross income—as it
was from 1941 to 1943 for gross incomes not exceeding $3,000—its
application on a grand scale was not possible without considerable
inequity. A salaried worker and a storekeeper may have equal net in-
comes before personal deductions, but the gross income of the store-
keeper would in most cases significantly exceed that of the employee.
Therefore, the new statutory income concept that evolved to fill the
need for simplification came close to being gross income less business
deductions. It was closer than any previous definition used in tax legis-
lation to what many economists would consider net income. It placed
all taxpayers on a fairly comparable income basis before computation
ordinary course of business, and also in which taxes appeared as a personal expense.
Senator Hollis, referring to property taxes deductible by homeowners but not by
renters, concluded that the best solution would be to disallow deduction of all
taxes, business and nonbusiness(ibid., p. 6325). Senator McCumber cited the tax
on a pleasure automobile to arrive at a similar conclusion (p. 6327). But there is no
record of a proposal for separate treatment of taxes incurred as business expense and
those incurred as a nonbusiness expense.
19 This device gave taxpayers the option of determining their tax liability by use
of a schedule stating the tax due, by size of income and number of exemptions,
computed after a blanket allowance covering all personal deductions. The blanket
allowance was to be sufficiently high to induce the majority of taxpayers to choose
the simplified return rather than itemizing personal deductions.
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of personal deductions. But its designation as "adjusted gross income,"
as if it were an intermediate income concept, was somewhat awk-
ward.20
While beginning with 1944 an explicit distinction was attempted be-
tween expenses incurred in the creation of income and expenses in-
curred in its disposition (spending), the distinction is not yet com-
plete. The catch-all category of deductions, miscellaneous, continues to
include a substantial amount of business costs, that is, expenses in-
curred in the course of professional or occupational activity of wage
and salary earners and some incurred for the management of prop-
erty.2' Apparently for administrative reasons these expenses were not
allowed as deductions in arriving at adjusted gross income, but only
as deductions from adjusted gross income by taxpayers not self-em-
ployed. Therefore, such taxpayers who elect to use the standard deduc-
tion cannot also separately deduct these miscellaneous items connected
with the production of taxable income.22
Some Recent Developments
With the enactment of the 1954 Revenue code, personal deductions
have been liberalized and some new ones added.28 The most recent
additions are likely to be important, both quantitatively and with
regard to policy. They include expanded deductions for medical ex-
penses, for interest paid on installment plan purchases, and for philan-
thropic contributions, and an entirely new type of deduction under
the heading, "expenses for care of certain dependents.
20 The meaning of the new income concept might have been better conveyed had
it been named statutory net income, and the old net income changed to adjusted
net income. Instead, from 1944 until 1954, when the term was abolished, statutory
net income was used as in previous years for gross income less all deductions, busi-
ness and personal. There was considerable confusion about the new term, adjusted
gross income, when introduced as part of the tax simplification bill. In the House
debate it was referred to as "gross income," "adjusted net income," and even "gross
net income" (ibid., p. 4011).
21 Examples are dues to labor unions and professional societies, tools and supplies,
fees to employment agencies and investment counsel, rentals on safe deposit boxes,
and amortizable bond premiums.
22 Some arbitrariness is unavoidable in this type of arrangement. Taxpayers in
a position to classify at their discretion part, or all, of their receipts may choose to
designate them as business income in order to obtain both the miscellaneous busi-
ness-type deductions and the standard deduction. Frequently, for example, salaried
professional persons who have occasional receipts from professional activities out-
side their main employment, can, if they wish, declare them in the business schedule
of the tax return.
23 For a fuller discussion of the changes brought on by the 1954 code, see Joseph
A. Pechman, "Individual Income Tax Provisions of the 1954 Code," National Tax
Journal, March, 1955.
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Of the expansions, that in the medical and dental allowance is
quantitatively the most significant. The previous exclusion of 5 per
cent of adjusted gross income, for which no deduction was allowed,
was reduced to 3 per cent.24 There is no evidence that new statistical
findings on the pattern of private medical expenditures as such under-
lay this move. Rather, public concern with medical care and health in
the postwar decade, at times as far reaching as the demand of part of
the public for some kind of governmental health insurance plan, seems
to account for Congress's revision of the original idea of extraordinary
medical expenses.25 In addition, the upper limit on the deductible
amount was doubled to allow a married couple filing a joint return to
deduct as much as $10,000 for medical expenses, and a single taxpayer
(without dependents) as much as $2,500. But, as shown in Chapter 7,
the increase in the ceiling has had no immediate significance for the
majority of taxpayers.
Until 1954, interest charges on installment purchases were deducti-
ble only if the installment contract stated the interest separately from
other carrying charges. Under the new law interest is deductible even
if not clearly identified as such, but the deduction is limited to 6 per
cent of the average unpaid balance due under the installment contract
during the taxable year. The respective House and Senate committees
parted company on this measure, but the House version as summarized
above was eventually enacted. The House Committee was concerned
with the inequity resulting from denying a deduction to those whose
contracts did not identify interest specifically. The Senate Finance
Committee deleted the provision for fear it might "encourage the prac-
tice of hiding the interest charge imposed under some other name";
because it might create a presumption that the proper interest charge
is 6 per cent; and because most taxpayers who might have such un-
named interest charges are likely to choose the standard deduction, so
24Formedicines and drugs a new and separate exclusion of 1 per cent of income
was established with the intention of eliminating from the deduction most of the
routine and ordinary household remedies, such as iodine, aspirins, and so forth. In
effect, medical and dental expenses must thus exceedto 4 percent of the taxpayer's
income before a deduction can be made. To the extent that taxpayers succeed in
having some of their expenses for pharmaceuticals transferred to doctors' and den-
tists' bills, the floor may be nearer to 3 than to 4 per cent.
25Boththe House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee
reported, in identical sentences: "There is general agreement that limiting the
deduction only to expenses in excess of 5 per cent of adjusted gross income does
not allow the deduction of all 'extraordinary' medical expenses" (Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, H. Dept. 1337 to accompany House Report 8300,83rdCong., 2nd Sess.,
March 9, 1954, p. 20).
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they would obtain no benefit from the provision.26 In 1954, for the
second time since 1952, Congress raised the ceiling on the amount of
philanthropic contributions deductible, but the increase was restricted
to gifts to churches, educational institutions, and hospitals. The new
law raised the limit from 20 to 80 per cent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income, provided the extra 10 per cent fell within any of the
three categories mentioned. This innovation was "designed to aid these
institutions in obtaining the additional funds they need, in view of
their rising costs and the relatively low rate of return they are re-
ceiving on endowment funds."27 The additional subsidy thus chan-
nelled to those institutions has probably been a modest one, as we shall
see in Chapter 4, and the device adopted for it probably quite inef-
fectual in some cases. The taxpayer who already contributes 10 per
cent of his income to his church, university, and a hospital can contrib-
ute the additional 20 per cent of his income for any recognized philan-
thropic purpose. In other words, even if a taxpayer expands his phil-
anthropic contributions from 20 per cent of his income to 30 because
of the increased deduction allowance, part or all of his increased gifts
may go to other types of philanthropic organizations. The Finance
Committee's Report estimated the resulting revenue cost at $25 million
for the first year. For 1954 the amount of contributions reported in
excess of 20 per cent of income on tax returns came to $67 million, of
which $13 million was reported on nontaxable returns. This was a
small increase in relation to the $3.9 billion itemized contributions
reported on all tax returns for that year.
Beginning with 1954, working mothers were for the first time given
an allowance for child-care expenses. The new allowance is carefully
drawn to exclude all but those taxpayers whose child-care expenses are
genuinely connected with earning a livelihood. A deduction of up to
$600 is granted to working widows, widowers, and divorced persons for
actual expenses incurred in the care of a child under 12 years of age,
or of any dependent, including a working wife's husband, mentally
or physically incapable of self care. The deduction may be claimed also
by all other working wives provided they file joint returns with their
husbands and their combined income does not exceed $4,500 after
the deduction.
This new allowance represents a refinement of taxable income to-
26 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, S. Dept. 1622 to accompany House Report 8300,
83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., June 18, 1954, p. 22.
House Report 8300, p. 25.
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ward increased interpersonal equity. Child-care expenses are commonly
considered part of personal consumption outlays, though the House
Ways and Means Committee explained that it had approved the de-
duction "because it recognizes that a widow or widower with young
children must incur these expenses in order to earn a livelih6od and
that they, therefore, are comparable to an employee's business ex-
penses."28 If strictly adhered to, the comparison with an employee's
business expenses could lead to a multiplicity of deductions covering
outlays all of which are necessary in order to earn a livelihood. An al-
ternative explanation is that offered by Pechman,29 that the child-care
deduction "is concerned with the fact that the value of services con-
tributed by the housewife in the home is not included in taxable in-
come." Thus when a housewife accepts employment outside the home
and spends part of her earnings for child care, she is now taxed on a
part of her income the equivalent of which was formerly untaxed. The
situation is similar to that of residential housing, where imputed in-
come from owner-occupied houses is untaxed. The issue can be re-
solved either by including an imputed amount of income in the tax-
able income of the housewife, or by allowing a compensating deduc-
tion to those who have substituted money income for income in kind.
The new child-care allowance constitutes a compensating deduction,
though only a very small one, from the substituted money income.
The child care allowance, like all other personal deductions, is
available only to those itemizing their deductions. Since the standard
deduction was not increased to allow for the additional deduction and
the liberalizations of older ones noted above, the trend away from the
standard deduction, which we shall observe in Chapters 3 and 8, be-
came intensified from 1954 on.
Three Reasons for Deductions
Even though the tax laws have made it explicit that some personal
and consumption expenses are deductible in computing taxable in-
come, the haphazard enactment of these allowances over nearly forty
years is more than evident. There has been no systematic legal review of
the selection of personal expenses, if any, to be allowed as deductions
from taxable income, or of the consistency of such choices with any
underlying concepts of income or of social policy.
As we have seen in the foregoing historical sketch of personal deduc-
tions, there are three main explanations for their enactment. The first
28Ibid.,p.30. 29Ibid.,p.120.
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is simply the lack of distinction between personal expenses on the
one hand and business expenses and losses on the other, which appears
to have been of significance in drawing up the first income tax laws.
It is probably the primary reason that interest payments, various taxes,
and casualty losses of property have always been allowable deductions,
whether they occur as business or as personal consumption expenses.
The second reason is the desire to encourage certain expenditures,
that is, to provide an incentive to expand or maintain private outlays
of a specified type. The deduction for philanthropic contributions is
usually explained on that ground.3° From the point of view of the in-
dividual taxpayer, the federal government pays part of the cost of his
donations. An alternative interpretation sometimes advanced, but not
widely accepted, is that the deduction is granted in recognition that
the taxpayer has parted with some of his income without any benefit
to himself in return, so that gifts require treatment on a par with losses.
The third explanation for personal deductions lies in the desire for
greater interpersonal equity than might be obtained with economic
net income, 'however defined, alone. The equity consideration is served
by shifting part of the tax load from those who are burdened with "un-
avoidable" and emergency type expenditures to others who have no
such expenses or can "afford" to bear them. In this instance, the redis-
tributive character of the allowance is the primary motive behind its
enactment. The medical expense and child-care allowances are cases
in point.
Of course the earliest group of deductions, enacted without any ex-
plicit considerations of incentive-subsidy or equity, nevertheless exert
either or both of these influences. These are the considerations usually
emphasized in present-day discussions of their merits. Like the medical
expense allowance, those for casualty losses, alimony payments, state
and local income, and sales taxes, may be said to serve some interper-
sonal equity purposes. As with the philanthropic contributions, the
3°Whenthe question of the deductibility of philanthropic contributions was first
raised in 1913, the amendment's author pleaded that "if a man wants to make a
gift of charity, he ought to be encouraged so to do and not discouraged" (Con.
gressionalRecord, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913, p. 1259). And the liberalization of the
allowance under the 1954 act in favor of schools, churches, and hospitals was ex-
pressly intended "to aid these institutions"(see note 23 above). See also C. Lowell
Harriss, "Philanthropy and Federal Tax Exemption," Journal of Political Economy,
August, 1939, p. 527; Vickrey, op.cit., pp. 180-131; Melvin I. White, "Deductions for
Nonbusiness Expenses and an Economic Concept of Net Income," Federal Tax Policy
for Economic Growth and Stability, Papers submitted by panelists appearing before
the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., November 9, 1955, pp. 364-65; and Pechman, op.cit., p. 7.
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incentive-subsidy element, rather than equity, appears the paramount
factor in the allowance of interest paid on personal loans, installment
debts,8' and home mortgages and taxes on owner-occupied residential
property.
All the personal deductions have in varying degrees such a privileged
expenditure character. They encourage the expansion of the deducti-
ble type of expenditures to the extent that the latter has some price
elasticity. The deduction allowances for medical expenses, installment
interest, and alimony payments32 thus have some small incentive effect
in addition to their equity function. The deductibility on the federal
return of state and local income and sales taxes may make them more
acceptable to the electorate, but it is difficult to say whether this feature
has had any appreciable effect on the extent to which they are im-
posed.33
All the personal deductions also affect the distribution of income
after tax. This is implied in the deductions that are intended for more
equitable distribution of the tax burden. As they redistribute tax lia-
bility they redistribute a portion of after-tax income from the well
31 Most writers tend to think of the personal interest deduction as lowering the
cost of borrowing, viewing it as a subsidy to the borrower. In contrast, Melvin I.
White, in examining the interest deductions for their consistency with "a system-
atically defined economic concept of personal income," assigns to interest on personal
and installment loans primarily the characteristics of an equity device (see White,
op.cit., pp. 353ff).Thedeductibility of interest, he reasons, tends to right the balance
between those who purchase a durable consumer good outright and those who pur-
chase it with the help of credit. White thinks that the ideal solution would be to
impute a return to the user-owner of durable goods, permitting interest payments
as a deduction for the borrower-owner, but he acknowledges the difficulty of making
such imputations for most durable goods. While imputation would remove inequities
to those who purchase or rent their services, White holds that this group is com-
paratively small in durable goods other than houses. He concludes that a larger
measure of equity results if installment and interest payments on consumer durables
are allowed as deductions than if disallowed. In the case of housing, however, where
renters are a very significant part of the consumer population, he concludes that
an interest deduction increases the inequity to the renter, although it puts the
debtor.owner on a more equitable footing with the clear owner. (For a more ex-
tended treatment of the nature of the interest deduction, see Chapter 6.)
32 While deductibility is not likely to have affected the divorce rate any more than
income-splitting has affected the number of marriages, it may nevertheless have
permitted some alimony settlements to be more generous than they would otherwise
have been.
State income taxes, next to property taxes the most prominent instance of tax
deductibility, have not risen significantly either in number or in rates since the
1930's. Yet since then the value of deductibility has risen steeply. It is particularly
noteworthy that rate graduation in state income taxes stops, as a rule, at relatively
low income levels. In 1953 over one-half of state income taxes reached their maxi-
mum rate at or below $10,000 of taxable income. See U.S. Treasury Department,
Tax Analysis Staff, Overlapping Taxes in the United States, 1954, Table 12.
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to the sick, from the young to the old, and from persons living in low-
tax states to those in high-tax states. But redistribution also occurs
through those deductions chiefly aimed at encouraging expenditures
considered socially desirable. There is redistribution from tenants to
homeowner occupants, and from "non-philanthropic" contributors to
those who contribute money and property to
If a deduction is primarily designed to stimulate private expendi-
tures in areas of strong public interest, it may, in effect, become an
indirect government expenditure. But more than an overlapping of
private and public interest in certain expenditures, such as philan-
thropy and medical care, is necessary to genuinely equate a deduction
allowance with indirect public expenditures. For the desired effect, tax-
payers claiming the deductions must also expand their deductible ex-
penditures as a result of the tax rebate. In other words, if a deduction
is to serve as a tax incentive, the underlying expenditures must have a
certain degree of price-elasticity. If taxpayers, despite the deduction,
merely spend about the same they would have in any case, then the
deduction allowance would in effect, although not by design, become
solely a question of equity among taxpayers.
The distinction here between equity motivated deductions and de-
ductions that serve as incentive devices is of more than merely formal
significance. If an allowance, by way of refining a person's net income,
is considered as part of the attempt to define capacity to pay tax, then
a deduction from net income of that expense may be held appropriate.
If, on the other hand, the allowance is part of a public policy to ad-
vance a given social or economic goal, it may be argued that a tax
credit is called for. Reduction in tax resulting from a deduction de-
pends on the size of the taxable income reported. A tax credit, pro.
vided it is granted at the same rate (20 or B0 per cent, for example)
to everyone, brings, for a given deductible expenditure, a tax reduction
that is the same for almost all taxpayers,85 regardless of income size.
The question of the form allowed for the deduction has been fre-
quently raised concerning the allowance for philanthropic contribu-
tions. Recently this has become particularly acute regarding a fre-
quently proposed allowance for educational expenses.3° Many have
34SeeRobert J. Lampman, "The American Tax System and Equalization of In-
come," Proceedings of the 49th Annual Conference on Taxation, National Tax As-
sociation, 1956, p. 277.
Anexception occurs when the tax credit to which a taxpayer is entitled exceeds
his tax liability before credit.
See, for instance, The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High
15PERSONAL EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS
favored a tax credit for educational expenses rather than a deduction
from taxable income, on the ground that the latter "constitutes an up-
side down subsidy to education: the larger the income, the greater the
subsidy in the form of tax savings... Thisreasoning proceeds from
the premise that the allowance would be intended to encourage greater
private expenditures for education in place of greater budgetary ap-
propriations. Others have favored simple deductions from income of all
or selected educational expenses. Indeed, two such deductions con-
nected with education are currently allowed on a limited scale. The
1954 Revenue code eliminates the $600 gross income test for determin-
ing the dependency status of children over 19 years of age still attend-
ing school, and it provides that scholarship aid need not be reckoned
in determining whether a taxpayer provides over half the support of
a child. Since 1958, outlays made by a teacher to further his education
may be deducted even if such expenses are incurred voluntarily to im-
prove professional status. Previously the latter expenses were deducti-
ble only if required to maintain existing salary and status.
Evidently, the kind of broad deduction that might be allowed in the
future for educational expenses will depend, in some measure, on the
distinctions we have attempted to bring out above. If educational ex-
penses are an appropriate consideration in determining relative ca-
pacity to pay, equity among taxpayers being the governing principle,
a deduction from income may be called for. In that case the personal
investment aspect of education may be cited as the determining factor,
and the deduction might take the form of a depreciation allowance.
Needless to say, many do not view education as an investment, and
many students do not pay their own expenses but receive them as gifts
from parents or relatives. On the other hand, if education is to be
made increasingly the object of communal investment, and the income
tax is to be utilized for that purpose, a tax credit may be held most
appropriate.
School, Second Report to the President, Washington, D.C., July, 1957, p. 56; Na-
tional Science Foundation, Basic Research—A National Resource (a report to Presi-
dent Eisenhower), Washington, November, 1957, p. 50; and testimony by John F.
Meck, on behalf of the American Council on Education, American Alumni Council,
Association of American Colleges, and State Universities Association, at hearings be-
fore the House Ways and Means Committee on Federal Revenue Revision, 85th
Cong., 2nd Sess., Part 1, January, 1958, pp. 1061-66.
31WalterW. Heller, "U.S. Tax Policy for 1958," Canadian Tax Journal, March-
April, 1958, p. 95. (But Heller, while giving the edge to a tax credit over an income
deduction, appears to favor neither for the purpose under consideration.)
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